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Abstract
Metaphysical indeterminacy in the context of quantum mechanics is
often motivated by the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. However, the sparse
view of Glick (2017) illustrates why it has no such implications. Other
links connecting quantum states and property ascriptions—such as those
associated with the GRW theory—may introduce indeterminacy, but such
indeterminacy may be viewed as merely representational and is susceptible
to familiar treatments of vagueness. Thus, I contend that such links fail to
provide a compelling motivation for quantum metaphysical indeterminacy.
1 Quantum Metaphysical Indeterminacy
1.1 Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Quantum mechanics has often been associated with indeterminacy. In contrast
to familiar cases of vagueness, the indeterminacy involved has seemed to some
to be worldly as opposed to merely representational. There are several possi-
ble explications of this notion of worldly or metaphysical indeterminacy. First,
there is the metaphysical supervaluationist approach developed by Barnes and
Williams (2011).1 According to the supervaluationist, a proposition is vague
just in case it admits of multiple precisifications, each of which assign it a truth
value, but some of which disagree about its value. Such vagueness is typically
attributed to our epistemic or representational limitations. According to Barnes
and Williams, metaphysical indeterminacy occurs when actuality admits of mul-
tiple precisifications, each of which is represented by an ersatz possible world.
On this view, reality is indeterminate just in case there are propositions about
actuality that are true at some but not all candidate ersatz worlds.
An alternative account of metaphysical indeterminacy is provided by the
determinable-based approach of Wilson (2013, 2017). This view eschews the
precisifications of the supervaluationist and instead allows for indeterminate
states of affairs. The guiding idea is that a state of affairs is indeterminate
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just in case it involves the instantiation of a determinable property without a
unique determinate.2 There are two ways this could occur: either a determinable
property could have more than one determinate (“glutty” indeterminacy) or
no determinates (“gappy” indeterminacy). Glutty indeterminacy involves the
possessions of multiple determinates of a single determinable in a relativized
or degree-theoretic fashion. Wilson (2013) gives the example of an iridescent
feather that is both red (from one perspective) and blue (from another) as a case
of glutty indeterminacy. Below we will see some potential examples of gappy
indeterminacy in the context of quantum mechanics.
In the discussion of quantum indeterminacy that follows, I’ll focus on Wil-
son’s determinable-based understanding of metaphysical indeterminacy. There
are two reasons for this. First, there is a concern that the metaphysical super-
valuationist approach cannot be applied to the case of quantum indeterminacy.
Several authors have noticed that no-go results such as the Kochen-Specker
theorem seem to rule out the possibility of maximal and precise ersatz possible
worlds that the approach seems to require (Darby, 2010; Skow, 2010). This is
an open area of debate and tangential to my primary concerns.3 Second, much
of the articulation and defense of quantum indeterminacy occurs in the context
of the determinable-based approach (Bokulich, 2014; Calosi and Wilson, 2019,
2021; Lewis, 2016).
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the remainder of this section, I briefly
introduce quantum indeterminacy in the context of so-called “orthodox” quan-
tum mechanics and the alternative offered by Glick (2017). In section 2, I
turn to the GRW theory and the case for indeterminacy there. I argue that,
while the GRW theory does introduce vagueness via the links between quantum
states and properties, this indeterminacy may be viewed as representational.
Finally, I conclude in section 3 by highlighting two remaining issues: alternative
interpretations and emergent indeterminacy.
1.2 Quantum Indeterminacy
Assuming the determinable-based understanding, quantum mechanics is alleged
to involve metaphysical indeterminacy in so far as it describes systems that
lack unique determinate values of physical quantities. For instance, consider
a particle characterized by a quantum state of spin that is a superposition
of up and down in the x direction, ψ = c1|↑x〉 + c2|↓x〉. In order to move
beyond the quantum state description, we need a principle linking it to certain
properties (“observables”). The best known of these is a tenet of orthodox
quantum mechanics:4
2A familiar example of the determinable-determinate relationship is red and scarlet. Scarlet
is a particular way of being red, hence it is a determinate of the determinable red. Note that
a property may be a determinate at one level of analysis, but a determinable at a “deeper”
level—Venetian scarlet is a determinate of the scarlet determinable.
3See Darby and Pickup (2019) for an attempt to resolve this challenge facing the meta-
physical supervaluationist and Corti (2021) for criticism of their attempt.
4It’s not entirely clear what constitutes “orthodox” quantum mechanics. For my purposes
here, I assume that it involves the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, the collapse postulate, and Born’s
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Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link (EEL): A system A has a value v of property
P iff the quantum state of A is in an eigenstate of the associated operator
Ô with eigenvalue v.
Applied to the particle, EEL implies that it lacks both the value “up” and
“down” of x-spin. Thus, one may be inclined to regard it as instantiating the
determinable of x-spin without a unique determinate of it.5 There are two ways
this could go: either it lacks any determinate of x-spin (gappy) or it possesses
more than one determinate (glutty). Initial applications of determinable-based
metaphysical indeterminacy to quantum mechanics focused on the gappy un-
derstanding (Bokulich, 2014; Wolff, 2015), but more recently, some authors have
advocated for the glutty view. For instance, the particle could be said to possess
value “up” to a certain degree (given by its modulus-squared coefficient) and
value “down” to a certain degree (Calosi and Wilson, 2019, 2021).
However, EEL alone doesn’t imply indeterminacy of either form. It has the
form of a biconditional between a quantum state description and the attribution
of a specific value of an observable. The situations alleged to give rise to indeter-
minacy are those where the quantum state isn’t in an eigenstate of the observable
under consideration. It follows that we cannot attribute a specific value of that
observable. But, as Glick (2017) observes, there is a clear distinction between
(determinately) lacking a property and possessing an indeterminate value of that
property.6 So, EEL is compatible with a view that eschews indeterminacy: the
sparse view according to which systems don’t possess properties—determinate
or determinable—for which they aren’t in an eigenstate. On the sparse view, a
particle in a superposition of x-spin up and down simply lacks x-spin.
While the sparse view may illustrate that the EEL is strictly compatible with
metaphysical determinacy, if the sparse view is sufficiently implausible it may
be alleged that any reasonable understanding of orthodox quantum mechanics
will involve genuine metaphysical indeterminacy. Indeed, some allege that the
sparse view has the implausible consequence that particles are not located in
spacetime and that measuring a particle will cause it to pop into existence
(Calosi and Wilson, 2021). In order to see why such worries are misplaced, let’s
briefly reconsider location on the sparse view of orthrodox quantum mechanics.
1.3 Quantum Location
To simplify matters, consider a particle that’s confined to a region X, which
is divided into 2 subregions A and B. We can write its position state as a
rule. See Wallace (2019) for a criticism of this view and Gilton (2016) for a defence of the
role of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link in “orthodox” or “textbook” quantum mechanics.
5I will be challenging this inclination below. For now, a motivating idea might be that we
can measure the particle’s x-spin, and when we do so, it will be found either up or down. So,
the particle in question is the kind of thing that can possess a precise value of x-spin even if it
doesn’t have one at the moment. This might incline one to regard it as possessing the x-spin
determinable without a unique determinate of it (until it’s measured).
6Consider, for instance, category mistakes. The number two lacks a determinate mass, but
this does not imply that its mass is indeterminate because it lacks the determinable as well.
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superposition c1|A〉 + c2|B〉, where |A〉 is the quantum state associated with
being in region A and likewise for |B〉 and B. From the Born rule we know that
the probability of finding the particle in region A is given by ||c1||2, and ||c2||2
for region B. Moreover, we know that the probability of finding the particle in
the region X = A∪B is 1. Given this, what should we say about the particle’s
position?
EEL implies that the system is (determinately) located in the region X, as it
is in an eigenstate of the associated operator with eigenvalue 1. With respect to
the regions A and B, EEL precludes attributing to the system a (determinate)
location in either region. Thus, the sparse view (indeed, any version of orthodox
QM) is committed to saying that the particle has a location—namely, it is
located in X. But, despite being located in X, the particle isn’t located in either
of the subregions that X comprises, A and B. This may require a revision of our
concept of position in light of quantum mechanics. In particular, it motivates
denying Precise Location.
Precise Location: being located in a region X is a determinable with being
located in xi ∈ X as determinates.
According to Precise Location, being located in a region X admits of further
specificity in terms of a proper subregion of X. Perhaps, as one moves to even
greater levels of specificity, the location of a system will bottom out in regions
that are exactly the same size as the object they contain.7 But Precise Location
doesn’t require this. All that is required is that the property associated with
being in a region X is, at the relevant level of specificity, a determinable property
with its only determinates corresponding to being located in proper subregions
of X.
Precise Location leads to position indeterminacy when applied to the case
described above. The particle will possess the maximally-unspecific position
determinable with the determinate being located in X. At a deeper level of
specificity, it will possess the determinable being located in X. However, it
will lack a unique determinate of that determinable. Either it will possess no
determinate or it will possess multiple determinates (e.g., each to a degree less
than one). One reaction to this is to embrace position indeterminacy in quantum
theory, another is to challenge the assumption of Precise Location.
Imprecise Location: being located in a region X can serve as an absolute
determinate.
On Precise Location, being located in X is both a determinate of a more
general location determinable and also a determinable with more precise lo-
cation properties as determinates. Imprecise Location, by contrast, allows for
regions that are intuitively larger than the physical system to serve as absolute
determinates—i.e., determinates that are not themselves determinables. How
7Of course, it’s often unclear what the “size” of a quantum system is. So, the relevant
notion of a maximally precise location might be the smallest region to which the system can
in principle be confined.
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does this differ from indeterminacy about position? After all, Wilson (2013)
refers to states of affairs involving determinables lacking unique determinates
as both “indeterminate” and “imprecise.” But absolute determinates are not
bare determinables—only the latter implies that an object has an indeterminate
position. On Imprecise Location, if asked where a particle confined to a region
X(> xp
8) is located, the answer is simply “in region X.” If asked where in
region X the particle is located, the proper response is not that it is indeter-
minate, but rather, that the question rests on a mistaken assumption, namely,
Precise Location. According to Imprecise Location, there is nothing indetermi-
nate about having a location given by a region that is intuitively larger than
the object in question.
This understanding of position is consistent with the standard formalism of
ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics. If we assume that observables are
associated with self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, then there is a problem
with applying EEL to a position observable that incorporates Precise Location.
The corresponding operator will have a continuous spectrum rather than discrete
eigenstates. In order to apply EEL, we need to consider operators that project
onto the subspace corresponding to being in some finite region of space X.
So, if we take this seriously as a guide to thinking about position in quantum
mechanics, position should always be understood in terms of questions of the
form: “Is the particle confined to region X?” Moreover, there will always be
some smallest region X beyond which the answer is always “no.” If the system
isn’t in an eigenstate of any operator corresponding to being located in a proper
subregion xi ∈ X, then EEL precludes attributing to it a location more precise
than X.9
Imprecise Location allows us to see why the sparse view doesn’t imply that
particles aren’t located in spacetime and don’t pop into existence upon mea-
surement. In realistic scenarios, it may be impossible to ascribe a position more
specific than the entirety of space. Even after measurement, particles will never
be perfectly localized for any finite period of time. This may be unsatisfying,
but such is orthodox quantum mechanics. Notice that the fan of indeterminacy
will be compelled to adopt a parallel position: that position is almost always
indeterminate. For instance, realistic position measurements cannot be under-
stood as removing indeterminacy given that the particle isn’t precisely localized
after a measurement either (at least not for any finite period of time). The
sparse view allows for a non-zero probability of finding a particle in a region in
which it isn’t located, but the implausibility of this claim rests on an under-
standing of measurement as revealing preexisting properties, which is rejected
by orthodox quantum mechanics.
A more significant problem with Imprecise Location is that intuitively quan-
tum theory provides a number of different ways in which a system can be located
8Let xp denote a subregion of X that would be regarded as a maximally precise location
for the particle. See previous footnote.
9Notice that there is nothing wrong with asking whether we will find the particle in the
region xi ∈ X if we were to measure its position. To answer this question we use Born’s rule,
not EEL.
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in X. There are any number of quantum states that are eigenstates of a pro-
jector onto the subspace associated with being located in X, for instance: the
equally-weighted superposition 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉); non-equally-weighted superposi-
tions c1|A〉+ c2|B〉 (where c1 6= c2); a more precise location xi within X (|xi〉).
Each of these imply that an ideal measurement will find the particle in X with
probability 1. Thus, Imprecise Location may be unsatisfying as an explication
of the location of the system as it’s unable to make important distinctions be-
tween the various states which seem to correspond to different ways the system
may be located in X. A natural way to correct this is to allow for determinates
associated with each such quantum state.
Quantum Location: being located in the region X is a determinable with being
in the quantum state ψi among its determinates, where P (being located
in X|ψi) = 1.
Quantum Location allows for many different ways of being located in the
region X. For instance, being in a particular superposition of |A〉 and |B〉
is one such way. EEL doesn’t license the attribution of any precise position
observables in such a state, but so long as there is some self-adjoint operator
associated with the quantum state, then it will be in an eigenstate of that
operator. Thus, EEL will license the attribution of properties such as being
in an equally-weighted superposition of being located in A and being located in
B.10 One might complain that such a property isn’t a candidate for a physical
property, but it has a clear connection to measurement outcomes (via Born’s
rule) and enters into causal/nomic relations with other physical properties. If
one allows specific superpositions to represent novel determinates of position,
then one gains additional resources that may allow the sparse view to explain
phenomena seen as challenging for the view, such as interference phenomena.11
The case of position generalizes. If a system is described by a quantum state
that is a superposition of x-spin—ψ = c1| ↑x〉+ c2| ↓x〉—what is the indetermi-
nate property? Suppose the system in question is an electron. Then we know it
has a spin of h̄2 , and we can use a two-dimensional Hilbert space to characterize
its spin. So, having a spin value is a determinable with a unique determinate.
EEL provides no basis for attributing the determinable having an x-spin. In-
deed, it is often said that (in orthodox quantum mechanics) having a spin in
one direction precludes having a spin in an orthogonal one. As in the position
case, it seems better to limit our ontological commitments to those properties
which are determinate: either (a) only attribute x-spin when the system is in
10The quantum state will not be in a superposition of the operator invoked in EEL, but we
may wish to describe the state in terms of a distinct operator with clear physical significance—
in this case, an operator with |A〉 and |B〉 as eigenstates.
11Of course, critics of the sparse view may allege that the quantum state must be given
some metaphysical analysis, and it’s here that metaphysical indeterminacy arises. Quantum
Location is a denial of this demand. The property possessed by a system in a particular
superposition of more precise position states is just that. Superpositions are novel kinds of
determinates, not to be further analyzed in terms of the observables that appear in their
arguments.
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an eigenstate of x-spin or (b) allow for superpositions of x-spin to count as de-
terminates of x-spin. On either approach, we never find determinables without
unique determinates. On the first approach, a particle in a superposition of
x-spin simply lacks x-spin (until measured). On the second approach, such a
particle has the property of being in a particular superposition of x-spin, where
such a property is a unique determinate of x-spin.
Again one might wonder how Quantum Location (and its generalization)
differs from indeterminacy. Perhaps saying the system is in a particular super-
position of x-spin (ψ = c1| ↑x〉 + c2| ↓x〉) could be understood as possessing
the “up” and “down” determinates to degrees given by the squared modulus of
their coefficients. There are at least two problems with this proposal. First, EEL
provides no basis for this claim. The state is not an eigenstate of x-spin with
multiple eigenvalues, so another principle would need to be invoked.12 Second,
and more significantly, distinct quantum states lead to the same expectation
values for x-spin values, for instance: the mixed state representing a system
as x-spin “up” or x-spin “down” with equal probability; a system in an eigen-
state of y-spin orthogonal to x; a system in an eigenstate of z-spin orthogonal
to x and y. Thus, the property associated with being in a particular super-
position of x-spin cannot be identified with the weighted possession of x-spin
determinates.13
In sum, the argument for metaphysical indeterminacy in orthodox quantum
mechanics rests on two assumptions. First, that particles possess determinables
corresponding to operators of which they are not in eigenstates. Second, that
these determinables have only the eigenstates of the corresponding operators as
their determinates. Each of these assumptions may be challenged, leading to two
versions of orthodox QM without indeterminacy. Rejecting the first assumption
leads to the sparse view on which one can only attribute properties to particles in
special circumstances, or when the properties in question are very general. This
meager ontology may be unsatisfying, but represents a natural way of thinking
about orthodox QM and doesn’t require denying that particles have locations
or pop into existence. Quantum location (and its generalization) rejects the
second assumption by expanding the determinates of determinables associated
with operators to include superpositions of their eigenstates. This view has the
benefit of attributing properties corresponding to superpositions while retaining
the one-to-one correspondence of determinables and determinates.
12Calosi and Wilson (2019) propose to replace EEL with DEEL, a principle that posits
degrees of possession proportional to the coefficients of the arguments of a superposition.
However, unlike EEL, DEEL is not part of the standard formulation of orthodox QM. More-
over, it goes beyond what is needed for orthodox QM to solve the measurement problem. See
section 3.
13This means that Quantum Location (and its generalization) is distinct from the glutty
indeterminacy view of Calosi and Wilson (2019). The former takes a particular superposition
to be a novel kind of determinate of the determinable associated with the operator that
defines the basis. The latter takes a particular superposition to correspond to a plurality of
determinates (each corresponding to eigenstates) each possessed to a degree less than 1. The
present point is that the views are inequivalent because the quantum state contains more
information than a weighted collection of determinates.
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2 Indeterminacy in GRW?
The sparse view shows that EEL fails to establish quantum metaphysical in-
determinacy. But many regard orthodox quantum mechanics (and EEL) as
problematic. Other interpretations may provide a more compelling basis for
quantum indeterminacy. In particular, discussion of the problem of tails in the
GRW theory has given rise to modifications of EEL which may be thought to
provide a basis for metaphysical indeterminacy.
2.1 The GRW Theory
The measurement problem results from the conflict between the linear, uni-
tary evolution of the quantum state according to Schrödinger’s equation and
the apparent fact that measurements have unique determinate results. The
GRW theory attempts to solve the problem by replacing deterministic linear
Schrödinger dynamics with a stochastic non-linear dynamics.14 In particular,
GRW dynamics involve spontaneous localization events (“hits”) centered on a
random point c and occurring randomly with an average frequency λ. The
crucial points for our discussion are the following:
• Localizations (hits) are very unlikely for individual particles, but amplify
rapidly with entanglement making it extremely likely for a hit to occur
immediately for macroscopic systems.
• Hits have the effect of applying a Gaussian distribution of width σ centered
on a random point c.
• The probability of a given point being the center of localization is given by
the squared modulus of the amplitude of the wavefunction in accordance
with Born’s rule.
Like orthodox quantum mechanics, GRW is an indeterministic theory, but it
differs in precisely specifying the dynamics that lead to wavefunction collapse.15
With suitable values for the frequency of hits λ and the width of the Gaussian
σ, GRW may be regarded as consistent with the current empirical evidence for
quantum mechanics.
2.2 The Problem of Tails
In orthodox quantum mechanics, EEL acts as a principle linking quantum states
and observables. In GRW, however, EEL must be replaced by a more forgiving
14The GRW theory is due to Ghirardi et al. (1986). It’s the simplest and best known of a
family of collapse interpretations. For more, see Ghirardi and Bassi (2020).
15It may be thought that indeterminism alone implies indeterminacy, and indeed, some moti-
vate metaphysical indeterminacy by consideration of the “open future” (Barnes and Cameron,
2009). However, the metaphysical status of the future is largely independent of whether there
are stochastic laws of nature. The path from indeterminism to indeterminacy is not at all
straightforward and inevitable.
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linking principle. The reason is that hits fail to localize the wavefunction pre-
cisely to a point. Indeed, while localizations cause the majority of wavefunction
amplitude to be concentrated near c, the tails of the wavefunction will extend
arbitrarily far away from c. Even after measurement, a particle will not be in an
eigenstate of the operator associated with being located in the neighborhood of
c, so EEL does not allow the attribution of a localized position to the particle.
This is a problem as the GRW theory aims to solve the measurement problem
by changing the dynamics of quantum mechanics so as to deliver determinate
measurement outcomes.16
To solve this problem, several proposals for a revised link have been offered.
In conjunction with reasonable assumptions, these principles allow the GRW
theory to yield determinate outcomes for many kinds of quantum measurements.
However, they also introduce a certain degree of indeterminacy. First, consider
Albert and Loewer’s fuzzy link.
Fuzzy link: Particle x is in region R if and only if the proportion of the total
squared amplitude of x’s wave function which is associated with points in
R is greater than or equal to 1− p. (Albert and Loewer, 1996, p.87)
Generalizing somewhat, the fuzzy link allows one to attribute a property
to a system when its quantum state is sufficiently close to an eigenstate of
the associated operator. “Sufficiently close” is captured by the 1 − p term,
which acts as a cutoff below which a determinate property cannot be ascribed.
Combined with GRW’s non-linear stochastic dynamics and assumptions about
the measurement process, the fuzzy link allows for determinate outcomes. A
position measurement induces a hit to the wavefunction of a particle, after which
it is sufficiently close to an eigenstate of the operator P̂c with eigenvalue 1 for the
fuzzy link to ascribe the determinate property of being located near c.17 This
determinate position property accounts for the measurement outcome, namely
a detection near c.
The fuzzy link introduces indeterminacy into the ascription of observables in
GRW. While EEL is unambiguous about the conditions under which observables
are to be attributed, the fuzzy link requires imposing a threshold of “sufficiently
close to an eigenstate.” This threshold has features characteristic of vagueness:
whatever threshold is chosen will be arbitrary, subject to disagreement and
context-dependence, and will admit of borderline cases. Such vagueness is not
unproblematic, but is familiar from ordinary cases involving the boundaries of
mountains and clouds, baldness, etc. This would suggest that the strategies
for dealing with familiar vagueness will apply here as well. In particular, ap-
proaches such as supervaluationism and epistemicism could be used to avoid the
16Armed with only EEL, the GRW theory is unable to secure determinate measurement
outcomes because it precludes the assignment of precise positions to macroscopic systems like
pointers that constitute such results. Again, the only position properties licensed by EEL are
those that attribute a location in the region to which a system is strictly confined. Often this
region will be no less than the entirety of space.
17P̂c is a projector onto the subspace of Hilbert space associated with being located in some
region C including c.
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implication of metaphysical indeterminacy. A supervaluationist could identify a
number of precisifications of “sufficiently close,” each free from indeterminacy,
but which disagree about the precise threshold. An epistemicist could claim that
there is a precise threshold that lies beyond our ken. Both approaches relegate
the resultant indeterminacy to the representational domain—the indeterminacy
is the result of our language or epistemic limits, not the world itself.
More recently, Peter Lewis has proposed another linking principle with a
more direct connection to metaphysical indeterminacy, the vague link.
Vague link: A system has a determinate value for a given determinable prop-
erty to the extent that the squared projection of its state onto an eigenstate
of the corresponding operator is close to 1, where the determinate value
is the eigenvalue for that eigenstate. (Lewis, 2016, p.90)
The vague link allows for properties to be attributed in degrees. For a
system sufficiently close to an eigenstate, the vague link says that the system
possesses the property to an extent close to 1. Crucially, it also allows that such
a system possesses other properties to a minimal extent. For example, a particle
localized around c would possess the property of being in the neighborhood of
c to a very high degree, but would also possess the property of being outside
the neighborhood of c to a very low degree. On its own, the vague link fails
to serve the required function for the GRW theory: it will not deliver (unique)
determinate outcomes for quantum measurements. One possible response would
be to reject the demand for determinate measurement outcomes, but such a
stance removes much of the appeal of dynamical collapse theories like GRW. At
any rate, this isn’t the approach taken by Lewis when presenting the vague link.
According to the vague link, my coffee mug almost entirely possesses
the determinate property of being on top of my desk, but it also
very slightly possesses the determinate property of being inside the
drawer. Because the degree of possession of competing properties is
so slight, for all practical purposes I can say that the coffee mug is
on the desk. (Lewis, 2016, pp.90–91)
This suggests that the vague link is to be supplemented with a further prin-
ciple that allows one to ascribe observables for all practical purposes when the
degree of possession is sufficiently high. This allows the GRW theorist to say
that measurements have determinate outcomes (for all practical purposes). But,
again it does so at the cost of introducing indeterminacy into the ascription of
observables. What counts as a sufficiently high degree of possession will exhibit
the same familiar characteristics of vagueness as the fuzzy link—arbitrariness,
disagreement, borderline cases, context dependence, etc. Moreover, these fea-
tures will be susceptible to the same representational analysis. What counts
as a sufficiently high degree may be subject to further precisification or may
be beyond our ken. Of course, the phrase “for all practical purposes” suggests
that Lewis may be happy to grant that such indeterminacy in the ascription of
observables is merely representational.
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So, the vague link is similar to the fuzzy link FAPP (for all practical pur-
poses) but it differs in that, strictly speaking, it is naturally understood as posit-
ing glutty indeterminacy. The opponent of metaphysical indeterminacy must
deny this aspect of the link, but there is very little cost in doing so. Quantum
indeterminacy is typically thought to reside outside of measurement contexts,
but on the fuzzy link indeterminacy is pervasive even after a maximally precise
measurement. This is why it’s unable to solve the measurement problem in the
context of the GRW theory without ascending to the FAPP level of description.
Compare a view that posits degrees of possession for the property of baldness,
where a very bald person possesses baldness to a degree close to 1 and a very
not bald person possesses baldness to a degree close to 0. This does nothing to
resolve or clarify the vagueness of our application of the predicate “bald.” We
have just pushed the problem back to what degree of possession is sufficient to
apply the predicate (FAPP). Similarly here, positing degrees of possession leaves
unchanged the question of when we should ascribe a determinate value of some
observable. The only remaining motivation for this aspect of the fuzzy link is
the thought that non-eigenstates must involve metaphysical indeterminacy, but
the considerations here are unchanged from the discussion of orthodox quantum
mechanics above.18
Thus, both links allow for the attribution of determinate properties (at least
FAPP) after measurement on the GRW theory, but in so doing introduce a
certain degree of indeterminacy. Such indeterminacy shares many of the features
of familiar cases of vagueness outside of quantum mechanics, but Lewis (2016)
alleges that it’s unique in at least two respects: (1) there is no continuum of
property values in which a vague boundary occurs and (2) it isn’t the result of
composition.19 I will address each point in turn.
First, it’s not obvious that there isn’t a continuum of properties in which
the boundary occurs. Recall that according to Quantum Location, each quan-
tum state is taken to describe a specific determinate property. In the context
of a position measurement, different quantum states could be arranged in a
continuum with respect to the degree of localization to which they correspond.
Even if one rejects this association of quantum states with determinates, there
is nevertheless an underlying continuum of quantum states (and corresponding
probabilities) in which the threshold for possession of a given observable is lo-
cated according to the fuzzy link. And again, where to locate this threshold
within the continuum of quantum states (or probabilities) exhibits the charac-
teristic features of familiar cases of vagueness. On the vague link, there is an
18Of course the GRW theory is a more “realist” interpretation than orthodox quantum
mechanics, so one might think that we are owed more of a story about non-eigenstates.
However, rejecting metaphysical indeterminacy doesn’t require silence about non-eigenstates.
In addition to providing probabilities for various measurement outcomes, such states can also
provide a basis for the attribution of novel properties along the lines of Quantum Location as
outlined in section 1.3.
19Lewis takes the GRW theory to involve indeterminacy that is both metaphysical and
distinct from familiar non-quantum cases of indeterminacy. Here I treat the distinctness claim
independently with the aim to rebut the claim that there is anything distinctively “quantum”
about the indeterminacy introduced by the GRW links.
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additional level of properties possessed to varying degrees, which may also be
ordered in a continuum. Along this continuum of degrees of possession, one
must establish some threshold that allows for ascription of the relevant observ-
able for all practical purposes. As with that of the fuzzy link, this threshold
shares the characteristics of familiar cases of vagueness and is susceptible to the
usual representational treatments.
Second, the indeterminacy here isn’t the result of composition, but com-
position is not the only source of indeterminacy familiar from cases outside of
quantum mechanics. The indeterminacy of a mountain, or a cloud, or some other
medium-sized object may be understood in compositional terms. For instance,
the indeterminacy of a mountain can be taken to concern which molecules are
part of the mountain and which are not. The case of observables in GRW is
not like this. As best we know, electrons aren’t composed of anything, and so
any indeterminacy associated with them cannot be the result of their compo-
sition. However, there are other instances of indeterminacy involving familiar
(“non-quantum”) objects that are independent of their material composition.
The indeterminacy exhibited by these cases admits of representational analyses
that make no appeal to composition.
Consider an ordinary doorstop. Whether a given object counts as a doorstop
is a matter of it performing a certain function, namely, holding open a door.
Clearly it can be vague whether a given object satisfies this functional role. For
instance, one may count a rock as a doorstop, but only if it is sufficiently large
or heavy to hold open the door, a matter that admits of degrees. Now, while
it may be true that a rock is composed of material parts, this fact is irrelevant
to the indeterminacy surrounding whether it is a doorstop or not. A represen-
tational view locates the indeterminacy in our representation of the object as a
doorstop, and hence, denies that it is an instance of metaphysical indeterminacy.
The representational approach is compatible with either supervaluationism or
epistemicism as applied to the specification of the functional role characteriz-
ing the entity rather than its composition—the indeterminacy dissolves if the
function of holding open a door is specified or known with sufficient precision.
Observables in GRW may be viewed as functional entities. Each property
has an associated probability of resulting in a certain measurement result. In-
deed, it is this connection that gives observables (and quantum mechanics more
generally) empirical significance. This suggests that the indeterminacy intro-
duced by the GRW theory can be understood in terms of whether the system
satisfies a given functional role. Consider again the case of location near c. If
the probability of being found near c is sufficiently high, then it is natural to
regard the particle as possessing the determinate property, being located near c.
But the probabilities form a continuum corresponding to the extent to which the
particle plays the functional role associated with being located near c. Both the
fuzzy and vague links may be seen as attempts to ascribe observables to systems
when they are almost certain to deliver the corresponding measurement result.
This is simply another way of representing the nature of the functional role of
observables in quantum mechanics.
Thus, even if some quantum systems are not composed of smaller parts, the
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indeterminacy of property attribution in the GRW theory needn’t be seen as
novel or metaphysical. It can be seen as an instance of the familiar vagueness
concerning whether an entity satisfies a certain functional role. Such vagueness
can be readily understood as representational indeterminacy.
3 Remaining Issues
In this chapter I have argued that two approaches to quantum mechanics can
be understood without invoking metaphysical indeterminacy. In the case of
orthodox quantum mechanics, the sparse view demonstrates that EEL does not
require metaphysical indeterminacy. In the case of the GRW theory, the problem
of tails requires modifying EEL in a way that introduces some indeterminacy.
However, such indeterminacy may be regarded as merely representational.
3.1 Other Interpretations
Several issues remain. First, there are other interpretations of quantum me-
chanics beyond those considered here, and nothing I’ve said rules out that they
may involve metaphysical indeterminacy. Indeed, there are variants of orthodox
quantum mechanics and the GRW theory that posit indeterminacy. For exam-
ple, Calosi and Wilson (2021) propose replacing EEL with a degree-theoretic
variant:
DEEL: A quantum system S has a definite value v for an observable O to a
degree y iff
√
y is the absolute value of the coefficient of the associated
eigenvector having eigenvalue v in the quantum state of S (Calosi and
Wilson, 2019, p.2621).
However, unlike EEL, DEEL is not part of the standard formulation of
orthodox quantum mechanics, nor is it needed for the orthodox solution to the
measurement problem. In order to secure determinate measurement outcomes
in the context of orthodox quantum mechanics, we only need EEL, not DEEL.
In the context of the GRW theory, Lewis’s vague link is naturally understood
as positing glutty metaphysical indeterminacy. But, as noted above, the vague
link alone is unable to solve the measurement problem in the context of the
GRW theory as it fails to secure determinate measurement outcomes after a
hit. Thus, neither link plays a role in the solutions to the measurement problem
offered by these interpretations.
Of course, the availability of indeterminacy-free versions of these interpre-
tations isn’t an argument for them over their indeterminacy-involving counter-
parts. Ultimately, as with many metaphysical issues in the sciences, the question
of metaphysical indeterminacy is underdetermined. However, there is prima fa-
cie reason to prefer avoiding metaphysical indeterminacy in physical theories
when it is possible to do so. Other things being equal, we should avoid interpret-




A second outstanding issue concerns the possibility of emergent metaphysical in-
determinacy.20 Suppose that an interpretation deploys a link from the quantum
state to observables that introduces some kind of indeterminacy. For example,
the GRW links discussed above allow for situations where there can be inde-
terminacy surrounding the location of a particle after a position measurement.
Any such indeterminacy will be emergent in that it is derived from the funda-
mental description provided by the quantum state of the system via the link in
question. But just because something is emergent doesn’t mean it’s not real,
so this fact alone fails to tell against quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. In-
deed, this is once again a matter that is underdetermined by one’s choice of
interpretation qua solution to the measurement problem. However, there is
more to say about the status of emergent metaphysical indeterminacy: whether
one countenances it has more to do with one’s attitude toward ordinary cases
of non-fundamental indeterminacy than anything specific to quantum theory.
This means that quantum theory is unlikely to make much of a difference to the
debate—those who find metaphysical indeterminacy in the everyday world irre-
spective of quantum theory can maintain their beliefs and likewise for opponents
of metaphysical indeterminacy.
First, consider the situation in the GRW theory. Suppose the position wave-
function of a particle has support within the region R but also outside of it. Is
the particle located in R? Given that the system isn’t in an eigenstate of the
associated operator (P̂R), it will depend on the details of our link, which may (or
may not) introduce indeterminacy concerning the position of the particle. Such
indeterminacy can be given either a deflationary or inflationary reading. The
former would say the indeterminacy concerns the attribution of the predicate is
located in R and may rely on standard treatments of vagueness to resolve the
indeterminacy. The latter approach would regard the system’s location as gen-
uinely metaphysically indeterminate—even though there is no indeterminacy in
the quantum state, the link introduces indeterminacy in the location properties
of the particle. It’s worth noting that Barnes (2014) regards emergent meta-
physical indeterminacy as impossible in principle. Barnes argues that if the
fundamental level is fully determinate, and it determines the emergent level,
then there is nowhere for indeterminacy to come from. However, Lewis’s vague
link provides a potential counterexample. For a system like the particle consid-
ered above, its quantum state description will give rise to multiple determinates
of the location determinable (each possessed to an extent less than 1).21 Al-
ternatively, one can adopt Albert and Loewer’s fuzzy link and only attribute
20For a defense of emergent quantum metaphysical indeterminacy, see Mariani (2021).
21Barnes doesn’t share Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy,
however, one may develop an understanding of the vague link that fits with the metaphysical
supervaluationist account. In the present case of a position measurement in GRW, one could
posit a candidate ersatz world corresponding to each location where the wavefunction has
support. Then, the position of the system will be metaphysically indeterminate in that the
truth of a proposition of the form the system is located in region R will differ between candidate
ersatz worlds, hence it will be indeterminate whether the system is located in R.
14
determinate properties. There remains residual indeterminacy in the specific
conditions under which we can attribute determinate properties, but this can
be regarded as an ordinary case of representational vagueness.
Second, consider Wallace’s (2012) version of the Everett interpretation. On
this view, the fundamental ontology is described by the universal quantum state,
which evolves unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation.22 This funda-
mental ontology gives rise to a vast emergent ontology of many quasi-classical
worlds, each populated by a full complement of macroscopic objects. As Wallace
recognizes, “it is commonplace in emergence for there to be some indeterminacy”
(Wallace, 2012, p.101). The number of worlds, the objects they contain, and
even human minds can exhibit indeterminacy. One reason for this is the process
of environmental decoherence that Wallace’s account relies on, but equally im-
portant is the functionalist account of emergent ontology he adopts. As noted
above, functionalist criteria often introduce a certain amount of indeterminacy.
It follows that if one endows such criteria with metaphysical significance—i.e.,
regards them as existence criteria—then emergent metaphysical indeterminacy
results. There is nothing incoherent about such a view, which would give rise
to widespread metaphysical indeterminacy in the quantum world. There is,
however, an alternative. One could take a more deflationary attitude toward
the emergent multiverse as a way of representing the universal quantum state
in terms that we can more readily understand. As Wallace (2002) argues, the
many worlds of the Everett interpretation could be seen as analogous to global
planes of simultaneity in relativity, indeterminacy in the properties of which is
the result of our representational limitations, not the world itself.23
What these examples show is that emergent indeterminacy in quantum inter-
pretations may be regarded as metaphysical or merely representational. Which
version of the interpretation one prefers will depend on their general attitude
toward indeterminacy in non-fundamental ontology. If one finds metaphysical
indeterminacy in everyday properties like baldness and heaphood, they may
find it in quantum observables as well. But, if one prefers to adopt a deflation-
ary strategy in everyday contexts, they are free to do the same here. A link
connecting the quantum state to observables may be taken to be part of our
representation of the quantum world, in which case any indeterminacy such a
link introduces will be representational as well.
22In the case of quantum field theory, Wallace advocates for spacetime state realism, which
understands the universal quantum state in terms of density operators assigned to regions of
spacetime. On this view, the fundamental ontology includes spacetime (regions) and properties
corresponding to density operators (see Wallace and Timpson (2010)).
23For example, whether two events are simultaneous is indeterminate in special relativ-
ity. Such indeterminacy is naturally regarded as representational given that instants—global
planes of simultaneity—are artifacts of our representation of spacetime. Analogously, if the
Everettian multiverse is “a more useful description of an entity whose perfect description
as a physical system lies (at least for the moment) beyond our ability to comprehend di-
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